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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment ?1 Such procedure would be a departure from the court's progressive policy of reversing only for prejudicial error and of settling
litigation in one suit wherever possible. 14
The court is authorized by statute "to render such sentence, judgment and decree as on inspection of the whole record it shall appear to
them in law ought to be rendered thereon."' 5 It is submitted that this
statute should be invoked to prevent useless nonsuits when sufficient
evidence for a judgment on the merits has been presented while the
defendant is still before the court.
R. MAYNE ALBRIGHT.
Real Property-Disposition of Real Property of Eleemosynary
Corporation upon Its Dissolution.
In 1912 Rosa Campbell conveyed for nominal consideration a lot
to "Rose Campbell Mission." The deed was in the usual form of deeds
of conveyance, and it contained no recitals as to the object or purpose
of the conveyance and no provisions as to trusts to be set up. Rosa died
in 1915, and the work of the Mission ceased. In 1931 the lot was condemned as a site for a high school, and an award was made to the
owners. Heirs of Rosa Campbell filed a petition claiming an interest
in the fund. A trustee, acting in behalf of the Mission, filed an exception to the auditor's report which directed the funds to be paid to the
heirs. The lower court overruled the exception. Held, since the Mission
was an unorganized society (it had not complied with the statute providing for incorporation of such organizations) and had wholly disbanded, the title to the land remained in the donor and accrued to her
heirs. Further, if the Mission had been organized and had dissolved,
the land would have reverted to the said heirs either under a District of
Columbia statute or at common law.'
The question presented by the principal case is, what (in the absence
"This is the "old-fashioned and mechanical way" not the "modern and progressive way" of dealing with technical errors of the trial court. WIGasOlM
Evidence, Impeachment of Witness on Cross-examination (1932) 26 ILL. L. Ray.
686, 687. See Cox v. Norfolk & Carolina R. R., 123 N. C. 604, 31 S. E. 848

(1898).
" Ball v. McCormack, 172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916); Kimbrough v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 182 N. C. 234, 109 S. E. 11 (1921) ; In re Ross,
182 N. C. 477, 109 S. E. 365 (1921).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1412; McINTosH, N. C. PRucmrCE AND
P~ocEDnRE (1929) §694; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §658. Cf. Amendment to Section 269 of Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. §391. It is now the settled
rule of appellate courts that verdicts and judgments will not be set aside for harmless error, or error which results in no substantial prejudice to appellant. fit re
Ross, 182 N. C. 477, 109 S. E. 365 (1921).
'Rose Campbell Mission v. Richardson, 73 F. (2d) 661 (App. D. C. 1934). A
District of Columbia statute provides that tht property in this situation shall
revert to the donor or his heirs. D. C. CODE (1929) Tit. 5 §321.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
of a statute) becomes of realty apparently granted in fee simple absolute to an eleemosynary corporation upon the dissolution of the corporation? At one time under the common law real property held by any
2
corporation reverted upon its dissolution to the grantor or his heirs.
It was said that the law annexed a condition of return, or the grant was
construed to be one only for the life of the corporation.3 At this
period, however, there were only municipal, ecclesiastical, and eleemosynary organizations, and business corporations of the modern type were
unknown. With the growth of the business corporation equity intervened to protect the rights of creditors and stockholders, 4 and now the
law is well settled that the property held by a business corporation goes
tupon dissolution first to pay the creditors and the remainder is distributed among the stockholders. 5
The law is not so well settled where eleemosynary corporations are
concerned. The same rule that governs business corporations has been
applied to eleemosynary corporations, thus allowing the property on
dissolution to go to the members." It has also been held that the property on dissolution may escheat to the state. 7 Some jurisdictions apply
the old common law rule and allow it to revert to the grantor or his
heirs. 8 Other courts allow the property to revert to the grantor if
it is a gift,9 but if it is a grant for valuable consideration, the members
of the defunct corporation are allowed to take it.10 One court has
held that if it is a grant for valuable consideration, it will escheat to
the state.11 The principal case in holding that the property procured
by donation reverted to the heirs of the donor is in line with a majority
12
of the cases.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that property
owned by an eleemosynary corporation, upon its dissolution without
'Commercial Bank v. Lockwood, 2 Har. (Del.) 14 (1841); Bingham v.
Weiderwax, 1 Comstock 509 (N. Y. 1848); Fox v. Horah, 36 N. C. 358 (1840);
1 BL. Comm. 484.
'1 BL. Comm.* 484; 1 Co. LIrT.* 157.
See Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U. S. 480, 15 L. ed. 499 (1855) ; Havemeyer v.
Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac. 121 (1890).
Richards v. North Western C6al and Mining Co., 221 Mo. 149, 119 S. W.
953 (1909); Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90, 26 S. E. 630 (1897); Service and
Wright Lumber Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry., 81 Ore. 32, 158 Pac. 175 (1916).
oMcAlhany v. Murray, 89 S. C. 440, 71 S. E. 1025 (1911) commented on
(1911) 10 MIcH. L. Rav. 121.
' Mason v. Atlanta Fire Co. Number 1, 70 Ga. 604 (1883).
8Mott
v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 21 N. E. 927 (1889).
o People v. Brancher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944 (1913).
" Mobile Temperance Hall Ass'n. v. Holmes, 189 Ala. 271, 65 So. 1020
(1914) ; Bates v. Palmetto Society in Columbia, 28 S. C. 476, 6 S. E. 327 (1888).
" People of The State of California v. The President and Trustees of The
College of California, 36 Cal. 1166 (1869).
'Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 21 N. E. 927 (1889) ; People v.
Brancher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944 (1913).
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creditors, goes to the sovereignty to be applied to a purpose similar to
that intended by the grantor.' 3 This solution is the best, for it is consistent with the rule of construction that the instrument is to be construed most strongly against the grantor; it obviates the necessity of
deciding that the transaction is either a gift or purchase; it comes
nearest to carrying out the intention of the grantor; it eliminates a windfall either for the heirs of the donor or members of the defunct corporation, and at the same time secures support for a worthy cause without
doing harm to any equities.
ROBERT BOOTH.

Taxation-Classification-Discrimination between
Corporations and Natural Persons.
A' Louisiana statute imposed upon every individual, firm, or corporation engaged in a dyeing, cleaning, pressing, or laundering business a
license tax measured by the gross receipts of the business.' The Louisiana Constitution,2 as construed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,

exempted from license taxes persons engaged in mechanical pursuits
who perform their work with their own hands.3 A number of corporations, engaged in the laundry, dry cleaning, and dyeing business, sued
to enjoin the enforcement of the tax, asserting that it denied to them
equal protection of the laws. A three-judge Federal District Court
denied the injunction and held: that the statute is not invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment; that the tax is not one upon receipts or upon
property, but that it is a license tax for the privilege of doing businessmeasured by gross receipts; that although corporations are excluded
from the exempt class for the reason that they, imaginary beings, cannot perform manual labor, the discrimination between corporations and
4
individuals is not unreasonable.
' Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U. S. 1,
10 Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. ed. 478 (1889).
ILA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §8612, provides: "That for every individual,
firm, association or corporation carrying on the profession or business of steam
dyeing, steam cleaning, steam pressing, or the business of steam or electric laundering, the license (tax) shall be based upon the gross annual receipts from such
profession or business, .. "
'Art. 10, sec. 8, reads as follows: "License taxes may be levied on such classes
of persons, associations of persons and corporations pursuing any trade, business,
occupation, vocation or profession, as the Legislature may deem proper, except
clerks, laborers, ministers of religion, school teachers, graduated trained nurses,
those engaged in mechanical, agricultural, or horticultural pursuits or in operating
saw mills. . .
'State v. Up-To-Date Shoe Repairing Co., 175 La. 917, 144 So. 714 (1932)
(this case also directly decides that the constitutional exemption does not apply
to corporations engaged in mechanical pursuits).
'White Cleaners & Dyers v. Hughes, 7 F. Supp. 1017 (D. C. La. 1934). The
Court decides that the tax is "for the privilege of doing business as distinguished

